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Abstract—In the last few years, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
(UAVs) are making a revolution as an emerging technology
with many different applications in the military, civilian, and
commercial fields. The advent of autonomous drones has initiated
serious challenges, including how to maintain their safe operation
during their missions. The safe operation of UAVs remains an
open and sensitive issue, since any unexpected behavior of the
drone or any hazard would lead to potential risks that might
be very severe. The motivation behind this work is to propose a
methodology for the safety assurance of drones over the Internet
(Internet of drones (IoD)). Two approaches will be used in
performing the safety analysis: (1) a qualitative safety analysis
approach, and (2) a quantitative safety analysis approach. The
first approach uses the international safety standards, namely
ISO 12100 and ISO 13849 to assess the safety of drone’s
missions by focusing on qualitative assessment techniques. The
methodology starts from hazard identification, risk assessment,
risk mitigation, and finally draws the safety recommendations
associated with a drone delivery use case. The second approach
presents a method for the quantitative safety assessment using
Bayesian Networks (BN) for probabilistic modeling. BN utilizes
the information provided by the first approach to model the safety
risks related to UAVs’ flights. An illustrative UAV crash scenario
is presented as a case study, followed by a scenario analysis, to
demonstrate the applicability of the proposed approach. These
two analyses, qualitative and quantitative, enable all involved
stakeholders to detect, explore and address the risks of UAV
flights, which will help the industry to better manage the safety
concerns of UAVs.
Index Terms—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), IoD, Safety
Analysis, Bayesian Networks, Functional Safety, ISO.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become an ex-
tremely popular technology 1. These flying robots have pro-
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1(2018) TopDr.One, “DRONE SALES STATISTICS ” [Online]. Available:
https://topdr.one/drone-sales-statistics/ .
moted the development of several applications such as sensing,
smart cities, surveillance [1], disaster management and recov-
ery, patrolling, aerial survey, and border security [2]. The drone
technology is becoming increasingly popular, and UAVs are
anticipated to be even more widely adopted in the future. This
is confirmed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in
the US, which expects that the number of UAVs consumers
will increase from 1.1 million to 3.55 million between 2016
and 2021 2.
The advent of autonomous UAVs offers significant benefits;
however, there are still open challenges that restrain their
real-world deployment. Because of the limited computational
resources of these low cost drones, their integration with the
Internet-of-Things and the cloud is an emerging trend. There
have been a very few attempts to integrate drones with the
Internet and IoT [3]. In [4]–[6], the authors developed a cloud
robotics platform, Dronemap Planner (DP), that allows the
monitoring, communication and real-time control of robots
and drones over the Internet. Dronemap integrates UAVs with
the cloud and aims to virtualize the access to UAVs, and
offload heavy computations from the UAVs to the cloud.
In [7], the authors proposed a cloud system for real-time
monitoring of multi-drone systems used for the tracking of
moving objects. The advent of autonomous drones has initiated
serious challenges like safety and security [8].
For this purpose, the safety of drones operations must be
ensured, as part of non-functional properties of the system [9].
Safety can be defined as a “state in which the system is not
in danger or at risk, free of injuries or losses” [10]. Because
nothing is totally safe and there is no situation where no risk
can occur, safety is also defined as the absence of unacceptable
risks [11], [12].
In fact, the use of civilian drones is still in its infancy
[13] [14]. In addition, UAVs are special categories of cyber-
physical systems that communicate using wireless, which
makes them more prone to safety risks and security threats
[15]. Since this is a relatively new emerging field, hazards
and risks of UAV flights are still not completely known
nor understood, which might jeopardize the safety of UAV
missions, especially due to the absence of standards and
regulations that govern the safe use and operation of UAVs
[16]. This is the main reason behind the limited utilization of
2(2018) William Atkinson, “Drones Are Gaining Popularity” [Online].
Available: https://www.ecmag.com/section/your-business/drones-are-gaining-
popularity.
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drones for civilian purposes 3 [17].
Moreover, the lack of policies, standards and guidelines that
govern the safe use, operation and emerging safety problems
of civilian drones creates a significant barrier to research and
development [18]. The limits of today's approaches to safety
have also been clearly demonstrated by the growing list of
safety accidents and incidents [16]. According to FAA 4 ,
more than 4,889 incidents have been reported between 2014
and 2017, which can easily inflict serious harm to people or
properties.
For this reason, safety should be considered as a core
requirement in every system or application design, and even
more for systems that can provoke great damages [10]. Thus,
without a clear understanding of potential risks of usage of
these drones, the public use of civilian drones will not be
possible at an acceptable safety level.
A. Problem Statement and Motivation
The safety assessment is an initial step to regulate the safe
use of UAVs. Different strategies have been proposed with
respect to the safety assessment of UAVs, i.e. assessing the
risk of an undesired event in a system, using both quantitative
[19], [20] and qualitative [10], [21]–[24] approaches. For
instance, the FAA developed a pre-flight assessment process in
which the Safety Management System (SMS) 5 was adopted
to identify the risks and the risk mitigation strategies to ensure
that no safety hazards will occur during the UAV mission. In
[21], Mhenni et al. recommended a framework for regulating
the safety of UAV operations, including a Model-Based Sys-
tems Engineering (MBSE) and a Model-Based Safety Analysis
(MBSA), integrating quantitative techniques such as Fault Tree
Analysis (FTA) and qualitative techniques such as Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
Gonc¸alves et al. [19] presented a safety assessment process
model for a UAV using Petri Nets, while [20] used Bayesian
Belief Networks for performing risk analysis of small un-
manned aircraft systems.
Some works such as [22] [23] proposed the identification
and assessment of UAV risk-factors (as obstacle collision,
untimely battery drain, human factor) based on qualitative
analysis. The current FAA Order 8040 approach to risk
management is also based on fundamentally qualitative and
subjective risk analysis [24]. The qualitative nature of the
current approach might lead to results that fail to be repeatable,
predictable, and transparent.
On the other hand, a rigorous safety assessment also re-
quires a quantitative analysis [25]. This is even confirmed by
[24], which recommends establishing quantitative probabilis-
tic risk analyses. Therefore, for completeness purposes, we
concluded that it is necessary to conduct detailed studies on
3(2011) Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). [Online]. Available:
https://www.trade.gov/td/otm/assets/aero/UAS2011.pdf
4(2017) Civilian Drone Safety Incidents Keep Rising. [Online]. Available:
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2017/12/08/473529.htm
5(2014) FAA Administration, “Sms safety management system manual
version 4.0,” [Online]. Available: https: //www.faa.gov/airports/airport safe-
ty/safety management systems/ external/pilot studies/documentation/jqf/medi-
a/jqfSMSdraftmanual.pdf.
the UAV safety assessment at both qualitative and quantitative
levels. In this paper, we follow a combination of qualitative
and quantitative analyses to identify hazards and risks that
can occur when drones are tele-operated over the Internet
(IoD). We propose safety procedures, safeguards and protec-
tive measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. We also
investigate the main reasons that might lead to drone crashes,
and analyze them in order to identify mitigation measures that
must be taken into account to avoid crashes and accidents.
Moreover, we identify probabilistic metrics of drone crash
events given some states of the system.
B. Approach and Contributions
To address this problem, we propose two approaches: The
first approach is qualitative and is based on the functional
safety standards ISO 12100 and ISO 13849. The second
approach is quantitative and is based on Bayesian Networks.
1) Baseline Standards and Approaches: The new Machin-
ery Directive 2006/42/EC requires a risk assessment for a
machine. ISO 12100 6 is a type A standard that applies to
everything that is defined as a machine under the European
Machinery Directive. It is used for machines for which there
is no type C standard, i.e. no standard dedicated to the specific
product or machine under consideration [26]. In our case, there
is no type C standard dedicated to the drones, thus we propose
to adapt ISO 12100 for the functional safety assessment of
drones. This standard specifies the basic terminologies and
principles of the risk assessment and the risk reduction for
ensuring safety in machinery design. These principles are
based on the knowledge and experience, past accidents and
incidents, and hazards associated with the machinery.
To comply with the machinery directives requirements, the
harmonized standard ISO 13849 7 is the most relevant from
the functional safety point of view as compared to IEC 61508
8, which is not a harmonized European standard. It cannot be
used as a proof of the CE conformity (European Conformity).
It is to be noted that a harmonised standard is an European
standard that demonstrates how a product or a machine
complies with the European Conformity. The ISO 13849
standard is internationally recognized and is a Performance
Level (PL)-focused standard whose outcomes can be equated
to IEC Safety Integrity Level (SIL) standards, which makes
it even more useful. ISO 13849 is a standard that can cover
most, if not all, concerns of the machine manufacturer (OEM:
Original Equipment Manufacturer) 9 in factory automation
safety controls . It combines the complex probability method
from IEC 61508 and the deterministic category approach from
EN 954-1 based on the risk assessment.
Unlike many of the other international standards, ISO 13849
is used for the safety-related parts of control systems and
6(2010) Safety and functional safety a general guide. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/.../1SFC001008B0201.pdf.
7(2018) Machinery Directive & Harmonised Standards. [Online]. Available:
https://www.cem4.eu/component/attachments/download/501.
8(2017) Functional safety, Technical guide No. 10. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/acd23f92341a4d50bf3500a245494af8/
EN TechnicalguideNo10 REVF.pdf.
9Understanding Machine Safety Guidelines. [Online].
https://www.festo.com/rep/enus us/assets/pdf/FESTO eGuide final2.pdf.
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diverse types of machinery; it applies to all technologies, while
IEC 61511 [27] is specific for the process industries and IEC
62061 [28] can only be applied to electronic components.
Most functional safety assessments are performed in a qual-
itative manner, as mentioned in the aforementioned standards.
However, for the sake of comprehensiveness of the safety
analysis, it is also important to complement the qualitative
analysis by a quantitative analysis.
Quantitative analysis uses model-based techniques for prob-
ability estimation, which allows systems to be analysed in a
more formal way. The Bayesian Networks (BN) formalism
is a commonly used approach for quantitative risk assess-
ment [29]–[32]. It captures the relations between faults and
symptoms, identifies and estimates the probabilities of risks
in various scenarios. For this reason, we will use Bayesian
Networks as our quantitative analysis approach for drone’s
safety analysis.
2) Our Methodology: Our approach consists in conducting
a comprehensive study of safety aspects for the usage of
civilian drones at a public scale through the Internet. We
combine the ISO 13849 and ISO 12100 standards to derive a
unified functional safety methodology. In addition, a process is
proposed for identifying and classifying hazardous conditions,
along with their possible causes and their consequences that
affect the safe operation of UAVs. Furthermore, the risk
mitigation strategies required to reduce the associated risk
to an acceptable level are outlined to ensure the safety of
drone’s missions when tele-operated and monitored through
the Internet. Based on the output of the first approach, a
quantitative evaluation method based on Bayesian Networks
is then presented in this paper. The Bayesian model of the
UAV crash risk is developed by causality, and the expected
probabilities of crashes associated with an UAV system is
analysed based on real flight data derived from literature [33]–
[37]. Finally, an illustrative example is demonstrated, and the
simulation results are discussed.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• First, we propose a qualitative safety analysis for func-
tional safety for drone crashes based on two safety
standards, ISO 12100 and ISO 13849.
• Second, a drone delivery use case is presented as a case
study in order to verify the applicability and the feasibility
of the proposed functional safety methodology.
• Third, we perform a quantitative safety analysis using
Bayesian Networks based on information given by ISO
12100 and ISO 13849 followed by an illustrative ex-
ample for demonstration; finally, simulation results are
discussed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the
recent regulations and research papers related to drones’ safety.
The qualitative safety approach is proposed in Section III
and demonstrated by a drone delivery use case. The Bayesian
Networks model is proposed as a quantitative safety analysis
method to validate the proposed functional safety methodology
followed by an UAV scenario analysis to demonstrate its fea-
sibility. Finally, Section IV provides some concluding remarks
and suggestions for a future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
The emerging drone industry is greatly evolving, yet still in
the process of establishing safety standards. To date, no safety
standard exists for autonomous drone systems. European reg-
ulations are still being drafted [16] and will be centered on
the safety risks posed by drones. Due to the current absence
of international standards, laws and guidelines that govern
the safe use and operation of civilian drones, many groups,
including companies and researchers, have issued their own
framework for regulating the safety of UAV operations.
A. UAV regulatory organizations and authorities
For maintaining the safety of UAVs and the public, the FAA
in the United States has developed rules to regulate the use
of small UAVs. The FAA has put out a “Know Before You
Fly program” 10 to provide guidance on the responsible use
of UAV and educate the public about UAV safety. The FAA
requests a preflight assessment with risk mitigation strategies
to ensure that the UAV will pose no risk to aircraft, people, or
property when the UAV loses control or other safety hazards.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
an international organization that collaborates with national
civil aviation authorities. It is concerned with basic regulatory
frameworks and provides information and guidelines for Air
Navigation Services. In 2016, the ICAO published an online
toolkit 11 that provides general guidelines for regulators and
operators [38] . The same organization further issued recom-
mendations for the safe integration of UAVs into controlled
airspace.
The Joint Authorities for Rule-making on Unmanned Sys-
tems (JARUS) is a group of national authorities that aims
to provide guidance to support and facilitate the creation of
UAV regulations. In particular, they recommend regulations
that focus on UAV safety. Further, Euro-control and the
organization JAA (Joint Aviation Authority) created the UAV
Task Force, with the goal of integrating UAVs in European
airspace through setting a guiding report on UAV safety
requirements. In March 2015, the European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA) published a regulatory approach for UAVs,
called “the Concept of Operations for Drones: A risk-based
approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft” [39], which
focused on the integration of drones into the existing aviation
system in a safe manner. This was followed by the publication
of the EASA Technical Opinion [40] introducing a Prototype
Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Operations, published in
Summer 2016.
The FAA and EASA together with EUROCAE, USICO,
JARUS, ICAO, and UVS International have defined formal
policies for UAV certification and a clear regulation for the
National Air Space (NAS) management. However, the new
regulations proposals will be officially published when EU and
10Know before you fly. Accessed: 19 January 2017. [Online]. Available:
www.knowbeforeyoufly.com.
11www.icao.int/rpas.
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US adopts it. These recommended regulations are available
and used as common guidelines until the legislation publica-
tion.
B. International safety standards
In Europe, to commercialize a machine (robot), it is required
to get a CE certification in accordance with the European
Directive on machinery 2006/42/EC [41], which states that
risk-management techniques should be achieved.
There are two alternative standards bodies that can be
followed when implementing functional safety systems in
compliance with the Machinery Directive: The International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) standard and the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standard 12.
Considering the nature of UAVs as vehicles or mobile
machines, the ISO/IEC standards are highly recommended
as they give confidence to the regulatory bodies to deliver
certification that ensures compliance with relevant regulations,
helps to protect the public, and can be adapted to be applied to
UAV outdoor missions. The main functional safety standards
in current use are listed below:
• IEC 61508: Functional safety of electrical/electronic/pro-
grammable electronic safety-related systems [42].
• ISO 61511: Functional safety, safety instrumented sys-
tems for the process industry sector [27].
• EN ISO 13849: Safety of machinery, safety-related parts
of control systems, General principles for design [43].
• EN 954-1: Safety of machinery, safety-related parts of
control systems, General principles for design [44].
• EN 62061: Safety of machinery, functional safety of
safety-related electrical, electronic and programmable
electronic control systems [45].
• ISO 26262: Road Vehicles functional safety standard
[46].
Every standard for functional safety-related control systems
requires a risk assessment. It is mandatory to perform a risk
assessment for a machine according to the new Machinery
Directive 2006/42/EC 13. Basic safety standards for risk as-
sessment include:
• ISO 12100: Safety of machinery-general principles for
design-risk assessment and risk reduction [26].
• ISO 14121: Safety of machinery, risk assessment [47].
• ISO 31000: Risk management-principles and guidelines
[48].
C. Risk analysis approach for UAV operations
In both national and international standards, the risk assess-
ment approach is an initial step to regulate the safe use of
UAVs. Several approaches have been proposed in the field of
safety assessment of UAVs. In [21], Mhenni et al. used drones
12(2010) ABB brochure, “Safety and functional safety:
A general guide,” Tech. Rep., [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/acd23f92341a4d50bf3500a245494af8/ EN
TechnicalguideNo10 REVF.pdf.
13(2010) Safety and functional safety a general guide. [Online]. Available:
https://library.e.abb.com/public/.../1SFC001008B0201.pdf.
as a case study to design a framework termed SafeSysE, which
merges safety assessment and systems engineering to provide
safety aspects. The objective of this paper is to develop an ap-
proach that automatically generates safety artefacts by adding
safety-related concepts to the system. This approach includes a
Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) [49] and a Model-
Based Safety Analysis (MBSA) [50]. This approach integrates
techniques such as Failure Mode, Effects Analysis and Fault
Tree Analysis for safety analysis. This process is not fully
prototyped and has not been tested in real scenarios. In our
case, we designed a safety assurance framework and applied
our methodology to real-world scenarios.
The works presented in [10] and [51], used ISO 31000
standards and their approach included identification, assess-
ment and reduction procedures. The papers show how this
approach has been applied in agriculture to find the sources of
hazards when using UAVs in performing agricultural missions.
However, the papers only provided a description of each step
in the approach without any specific details on how to be
validated. The experimental prototype is missing as the paper
does not demonstrate a real scenario. In the current paper, we
combined two standards ISO 13849 and ISO 12100 to derive a
functional safety methodology for drone operations, and after
that we applied this methodology to a real UAV use case.
In [20], the authors proposed two approaches, qualitative
and quantitative, in performing the risk analysis process for
small unmanned aircraft systems. The first one used a safety-
risk management process to identify hazards and the second
approach used a comprehensive probabilistic model based
on Bayesian network for risk estimation. The proposed sys-
tem mainly addressed some hazards without, assigning risk
level for each hazard, specifying the correspondent mitigation
strategies nor functional safety, while in the current paper,
we perform a detailed risk analysis of UAV controlled over
the internet including some IoD-specific hazards based on
international safety standards. In [22], the authors focused
on the identification of human factors errors and mitigation
techniques in UAV systems.
Sankararaman et al. [23], developed a framework for identi-
fying and predicting the occurrence of various risk factors that
affect the safe operation of UAVs. Their work only analyses
a simple case of risk factors, i.e. battery discharging and
collision while in our paper we treat various risk factors and
hazards that affect the operation of UAVs.
III. SAFETY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Our methodology consists in using two approaches for
safety analysis: (1) a qualitative functional safety analysis
approach, and (2) a quantitative analysis based on the Bayesian
Networks approach.
The first approach combines the safety standards ISO 12100
and ISO 13849. We conduct an analysis to identify the
hazardous conditions, along with their possible causes and
their consequences that affect the safe operation of UAVs. In
addition, risk mitigation strategies required to reduce the asso-
ciated risk to an acceptable level are outlined and associated
with the illustrative UAV use case, i.e. courier delivery with
the drone.
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The second approach is a quantitative evaluation method
based on Bayesian Networks used to model the safety risks
related to UAV flights and to estimate the probabilities of the
UAV risk of crash. A Bayesian model was designed based
on the output of the hazard identification step defined in
the first approach (refer to Figure 1), to conduct a more
detailed analysis of the relations between the risks of drone’s
crashes and their causes. Using this model, we assess the UAV
crash probability on an illustrative scenario. For background
information about the ISO 12100 and 13849 standards and
Bayesian Networks, the reader may refer to references [26],
[52] and [53].
In what follows, we will first present the qualitative func-
tional safety approach, and then the quantitative Bayesian
approach. The video demonstration of this methodology is
available at [54].
A. Qualitative Safety Analysis: Functional Safety approach
The proposed approach consists in a structured methodology
that combines the ISO 13849 and ISO 12100 standards in order
to derive the safety requirements of the drone operations when
tele-operated and monitored through the Internet (see Figure
1).
System Limits Specification
Hazard Identification
Risk Evaluation
High
Risk Reduction Measures
Risk Estimation
 Performance Level Required (PLr) 
Determination
 Safety Functions Identification
End
NO
Inherently Safe Design
Safeguarding and Protective 
Measures
YES
P
h
a
s
e
 1
 
IS
O
 1
2
1
0
0
P
h
a
s
e
 2
IS
O
 1
3
8
4
9
Risk Analysis
Risk 
Assesment
Information For Use
Fig. 1: The Functional Safety Methodology based on ISO
12100 and ISO 13849.
Description of the illustrative use case: To illustrate the
functional safety methodology approach, a drone delivery use
case is used to validate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach, since the drone delivery service has become an
emerging topic for different companies. As a matter of fact,
Google 14, DHL post service in Germany [55] and Amazon
in the U.S. 15, and many others are using drones to deliver
packages to customers.
We consider the case of a drone that goes from a source
location to a destination in an urban city, and will fly at
an altitude less than 100 meters. The drone may fly on top
of people, highways, streets, etc. When possible the path
of the drone will be planned above non populated zones,
but it might also fly over people to use the shortest path.
The deployment conditions are important to consider when
evaluating the hazards and their corresponding risks as it
will determine the severity of the risks. In fact, flying above
populated area will induce risks that are more critical than if
flying on top of forests or deserts. We also assume that the
drone communicates with the cloud using 4G connection, and
the cloud relay the stream coming from the drone to a ground
station/user. This architecture is similar to that proposed in [4],
[5].
It has to be noted that this use case is merely illustrative
and can be applied to other uses cases of drones applications
controlled over the Internet. We assume that the drone is
connected to the user through the Internet, which imposes
additional challenges that may lead to hazards such as network
delays and message losses. We will discuss these issues in our
analysis of the two approaches.
As shown in Figure 1, the functional safety methodology
has two phases: (i.) Phase 1 is related to the standard ISO
12100, (ii.) Phase 2 pertains to the standard ISO 13849. In
what follows, we describe the functional safety analysis of
the two phases for the drone delivery use case.
1) Phase 1: The ISO 12100 Standard:
a) Risk Analysis:: First, according to ISO 12100, a risk
analysis must be carried out, which starts with system limits
specification. The drone’s system limits are depicted in Table
I . According to [10], the drone limits can be divided into five
categories: (i.) Physical, (ii.) Temporal, (iii.) Environmental
and (iv.) Behavioral limits, (iv.) Networking limits. Table I
explains the five categories and provides concrete examples
and description of the limits. It has to be noted that the
networking limits are related to the communication with the
drones through the Internet, as compared with traditional line-
of-sight point-to-point communication.
The second step of the risk analysis consists in performing
hazard identification. Table II provides the list of potential
drone hazards according to their sources, external and internal.
This list was identified using reactive methods.
Reactive methods are incidents and accidents databases,
safety and flight reports, survey, maintenance reports [56]. In
what follows, we provide a list of commonly used reactive
methods:
• Accidents and incidents databases: (i.) Federal Avi-
ation Administration preliminary reports of Unmanned
14(2015) Google delivery drone. [Online]. Available:
http://www.techspot.com/news/62412-two-delivery-drones-built-google-
soontested-us.html
15(2015) Amazon. [Online]. Available:
http://appleinsider.com/articles/15/11/30/amazon-teases-new-details-of-
planned-prime-air-drone-delivery-service.
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TABLE I: Limits of the drone system.
Nature Description
Physical Limits Maximum take-off weight, maximum speed and maximum/minimum height.
Temporal Limits Maximum time of flight, response time of the commands or acquisition time of the sensors, battery degradation over time,
battery life.
Environmental Limits Weather conditions (wind speed, ambient light, or dust/rain presence), the minimum distance from populated areas or from
airports.
Behavioral Limits Actions performed by the pilot (both autonomous and manual).
Networking Limits Network delays, jitters, available bandwidths, latency, link availability and traffic congestion
Aircraft Systems Accidents and Incidents (FAA UAS
A&I) database, (ii.) National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), (iii.) FAA's Aviation Safety Information Analy-
sis and Sharing (ASIAS) database, (iv.) FAA's Accident
and Incident Data System (AIDS) and Drone Crash
Database 16.
• Safety and flight reports: (i.) NASA's Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS), (ii.) Annual Insurance Report
17 and (iii.) ICAO Safety Report 18.
• Maintenance reports: FAA's Aviation Maintenance Re-
ports 19.
• Surveys: NTSB's Review of Aircraft Accident Data 20,
FAA's Summary of Unmanned Aircraft Accident/Incident
Data 21 and review of previous research papers [33]–[37].
This list can be used in a straightforward manner as a
checklist during hazard identification to particularly prevent
inexperienced users of the drone from missing important
hazards. In Table III and Table IV, we present several possible
hazardous events and risk factors and their respective cate-
gories, including temporary short-time GPS loss during flight,
permanent loss of GPS during flight, degraded communication
quality, permanent loss of communication with ground station,
security attack on the drone, loss of UAV electrical power,
autopilot controller module failure, failure/inability to avoid
collision, pilot error, midair collision and weather effects on
UAV that affect the operation of the drone during the delivery
mission. It has to be noted that the risk assessment levels,
severity levels and probabilities in Table III and Table IV are
assigned based on our personal understanding of the illustrated
use case considered in this study.
For the case of a drone delivery, drones are controlled over
the Internet; hazards such as degradation of communication
quality can appear caused by networking issues such as
network delays, limited bandwidth and network congestion
16(2016) Drone Crash Database. [Online]. Available:
https://dronewars.net/drone-crash-database/.
17(2012) Annual Insurance Report. [Online]. Available:
http://www.modelaircraft.org/files/500-q.pdf.
18(2014) ICAO Safety Report. [Online]. Available:
http://www.icao.int/safety/Documents/ICAO 2014%20Safety%20Report
final 02042014 web.pdf.
19(2016). Aviation Maintenance Alerts. [Online]. Available:
https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/aviation maintenance/.
20 (2011) [Online]. Available: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/data/
Documents/ARA1401.pdf.
21 (2018) [Online]. Available: https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives
/maintenance hf/library/documents/media/human factors maintenance/a
summary of unmanned aircraft accidentincident data.human factors
implications.doc.
that affects negatively the drone performance and operation
causing collision with buildings and damage to UAV.
The third step of the risk analysis is the UAV risk estimation,
which measures the underlying probabilities and severity levels
of the consequences of the identified safety hazards of the
drone operation. According to the ISO 12100 standard, the
risk estimation consists in determining two parameters: (i.)
the risk severity and (ii.) risk probability.
The risk severity level is estimated based on the injury level
or the harmful impact on people, drone and environment. The
severity of the hazard is usually affected by the consequences.
We adopt the following four categories and their definitions
of the severity levels:
• Catastrophic: the hazard causes harm or serious injuries
or deaths to humans. The severity of such hazards is
the highest considering that it affects human safety and
thus must be carefully addressed and removed to avoid
fatal situations. For example, consider the case of the
drone delivery use case where the drone has to fly on
top of highways. The permanent loss of communication
with the Ground Station (due to control system failure,
electromagnetic interference, ...) may lead to a catas-
trophic situation as it results in having the drone falling on
the road and thus leading to accidents. These accidents
could result into injuries yet also deaths, which makes
the severity catastrophic, if no failsafe operations are
implemented.
• Critical: the event has effect on third parties other than
people, like for example making damage to building or
assets in general. As an example, consider the navigation
of the drone in space at relatively low altitude and the
hazard that the anti-collision sensors stop functioning.
This hazard can lead to a collision and a crash against
a building and may lead to damages to assets if it falls
on the ground, or breaking some window glasses of the
building, and thus is tagged of a critical severity.
• Marginal: the event causes damages to the drone system
itself. For example, when the drone is landing in a
certain open space, it is possible to lose control due to
interference to IMU and altitude sensors or GPS signals,
which may lead to the case of crashing against the
ground. This hazard will only lead to crashing the drone
or some of its part, with no damages on third parties or
people. Then, its severity is tagged as marginal.
• Negligible: the event does not affect the operational
capability of the drone but causes minor effects on drone
system performance (mission degradation). For example,
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TABLE II: Analysis of hazards sources.
Source Type Examples
External
Interference Electromagnetic interference (EMI), humans (eavesdropping of radio signals),communication interference.
Environmental conditions Wind, temperature, atmospheric attenuation, icing, precipitation, visibility (day or night).
Obstacles Fixed Obstacles (trees, electric cables, buildings), and dynamic obstacles (bird, cars).
Navigational Environment GPS Signal loss/error, GPS spoofing, ADS-B signal inaccuracy, navigation system error, attitude error,erroneous waypoint.
Air traffic environment Another Aircraft in close proximity, classes of airspace that may be flown nearby.
Electrical environment Man-made or natural RF fields such as High Intensity Radio Transmission Areas (HIRTAs), Electrostatic phenomena.
Communication Network Congestion, network unavailability/delays, Network Jitters.
Human factor Lack of safety culture awareness, security attacks (on the Ground Control Station, on the DataLink, on UAV),pilot error (inexperienced pilots, not familiar with the area, fatigue, rush).
Internal
Mechanical Mechanical fastener failure, actuation failure, motor.
Thermal Freeze, explosions.
Electronic Power loss, propulsion failure, saturation, overflows.
Algorithmic Verification error, decision-making error, delayed responses, infinite loops.
Technical factor Battery depletion, faulty battery cell, power loss, inherent technical flaws (i.e., design or production),technical malfunction, inappropriate charge cycle, loss of control, loss of transmission.
Software Control system failure, flight control system / verification error, autopilot error, system operation error,bugs in code, process errors, vision system failure.
Hardware CPU error, avionics hardware, flight sensors.
the number of GPS satellites may decrease in some areas
with high building which may affect the accuracy of
localization of the drone in space. This hazard does not
lead to crashes by usually it leads to temporary high
localization error that remain acceptable. This hazard is
tagged as negligible.
It has to be noted that the risk severity is particularly
susceptible to bias or incorrect assumptions, as severity is
generally subject to a qualitative analysis of an event and open
to interpretations [57]. In fact, the severity may also depend
on the context. For example, we have tagged the severity
level of the degraded communication quality as critical, given
the context it is operated on top of highways. Changing the
navigation context of the application to being on top of forest
or areas not having people, the severity may be tagged in this
case to marginal as it will lead only to drone crashing. Thus,
when applying the methodology, the severity has to consider
all playing factors of the use case and deployment assumptions
to be accurately interpreted.
On the other hand, the risk probability is defined as the
likelihood that the consequence of the safety hazard might
occur.
As the analysis is qualitative, the probabilities are not
expressed as numerical values, but as attributes. According to
[58], the range of probabilities of occurrence is divided into
five main classes:
• Frequent: the event is likely to occur many times or has
occurred frequently,
• Probable: likely to occur regularly but not frequent,
• Occasional: likely to occur sometimes or has occurred
infrequently,
• Remote: unlikely to occur but possible or has occurred
rarely,
• Improbable: very unlikely to occur or not known to have
occurred.
As a first example, we consider the hazard of a permanent
loss of GPS signals during flight, which may result in a drone
losing direction and crashes (see Table III and Table IV). A
GPS loss could potentially result in a collision with an aircraft,
UAS, or a damage to UAV or environment and ground, and
even humans, thus severity is catastrophic. In the condition of
open air environment and hovering at high altitude, losing GPS
signals could be seen as remote. Using the risk assessment
matrix of Figure 2, the risk of GPS loss is thus assessed as
”serious”.
Fig. 2: A typical risk assessment scoring matrix (based on ISO
12100 Safety of Machinery)
As a second example, the degradation of the communication
quality is another hazard related to the context of the Internet-
of-Drones. The degradation of QoS may be due to several
reasons such as network congestion, delays, jitters, commu-
nication instability, etc. Assuming to use a 4G connection,
the communication quality is most often stable and reliable,
but be subject to perturbation in areas with bad coverage
or due to signal attenuation. Therefore, this hazard can be
seen to occur occasionally for a typical 4G connection. The
degradation of the communication quality may result in critical
consequences (i.e. Severity is critical) as it results in inter-
mediate interruption of the monitoring during an autonomous
mission and can lead to collision with buildings. Using the risk
assessment matrix of Figure 2, the risk caused by degradation
of communication quality is estimated to ”serious”. Of course,
21A Matter of Risk Assessment, Liability & Compliance: Machine
Safety Labeling in the 21st Century. Accessed: JULY 23, 2014. [Online].
Available: https://www.automation.com/automation-news/article/a-matter-
of-risk-assessment-liability-compliance-machine-safety-labeling-in-the-21st-
century.
TABLE III: Application of Functional Safety Methodology for Drone Delivery Application
ISO 12100 ISO 13849
Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Risk Reduction
Performance Level
Required Determination
ID Hazard Source Type Element Cause Consequence P S Risk Level
Risk Reduction
Measures
By Inherently
Safe Design
By
Safeguarding
By Information
For Use
S F P PLr
1
Temporary Short-Time
GPS Loss during flight
External Interference UAV
Interference, going through a tunnel,
going through high buildings, ...
Temporary loss of navigation control,
unstable UAV,
small deviation from planned path
Probable Negligible Medium
Use high-quality
GPS devices (e.g. RTK)
x
Check for radio interference that
may compromise communication
signals
x
2
Permanent Loss of GPS
during flight
External Electronic UAV
Defect of GPS device,
loss of GPS signal
Control loss, collision with UAS,
crashing to the ground, UAVs
can lead to injuries to people if
flight is on top of populated zone,
UAV damage
Remote Catastrophic Serious
Use high-quality
GPS devices (e.g. RTK)
x
Minimize navigation paths
over urban areas and highways
x
3
Degraded Communication
Quality
External Communication UAV, GCS, Cloud
4G unstable Connection,
Network Congestion,
Long Delays,
Network Jitters, ...
Temporary loss of monitor and control,
occasional command losses,
collision with buildings,
damage to UAV
Occasional Critical Serious
Use a network with a
guaranteed quality of service
x
Implement failsafe mechanisms
when connection is lost
x S1 F2 P2 c
Verification and prototyping
through extensive network simulations
x
Monitor the communication
quality in real time
x
Log files x
4
Permanent Loss of Communication
with Ground Station
External Communication UAV, GCS, Cloud
Control system failure,
environmental condition,
power loss, software verification
error and EMI.
Crash into building, obstacle,
injuries to people, vehicle damage,
undesired flight trajectory,
uncontrolled maneuvers, loss of vehicle control
Probable Catastrophic High
Preflight inspection x
Monitoring the data link
performance during the mission
x
5 Security attack on the drone External Software UAV, GCS, Cloud Communication protocol insecure (e.g. MAVLink)
Drone control loss,
criminal attacks using the drone,
drone hijack
Probable Critical High
Secure the communication protocols
between the drone, cloud and ground station
x
failsafe mechanism x S1 F2 P2 c
6 Loss of UAV electrical power Internal Technical UAV
Faulty battery cell, faulty charge,
inappropriate charge cycle,
manufacturing defect, vibration
Degraded flight,
harm to people, crash
Occasional Catastrophic High
Check of battery in
preflight phase
x
Verifying the design
content of the drone
x
Warning system x
Parachute x S2 F1 P2 d
Flying above non
populated areas
x
Real time battery information x
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using another type of communication that is less reliable,
would lead to a different risk estimation.
The result of the risk assessment phase consists of a
prioritized list of hazards and their corresponding risk levels,
as shown in Table III and Table IV.
b) Risk Evaluation:: The risk evaluation step is defined
based on the results of the risk estimation step. In this
evaluation step, we identify all the risks that are not tolerable
and then we will process them in the risk reduction step. If
all the risks are acceptable, then, there is no need to proceed
further (refer to Figure 1).
c) Risk Reduction:: After the evaluation of risks, the
next step deals with the risk reduction. The process consists
in identifying the hazards that led to an unacceptable level of
harm; then, try to reduce the risk to a tolerable level.
The risk reduction measures for the drone delivery use case
are described below. According to ISO 12100, there are three
steps to follow for risk mitigation: (1) inherently safe design
measures, (2) safeguarding and (3) information for use [12].
In the first step, the strategy consists in following safe
design approaches without the use of safeguards or protective
measures to reduce the risk to an acceptable level in the
design phase, and to ensure the safety of the system. These
approaches include:
• Perform a safe design of the drone in order to improve
its stability, to avoid causing harms to a person.
• Prototyping and verification.
• Visual inspection for verifying and checking the design
content in case problems arise with the drone before
flying.
Applying the above principles in our context; in the case
of Internet-of-Drones, where communication occurs through
the Internet, it is important to use a designed network with a
guaranteed quality of service in terms of delay and throughput.
Then, the network design must be verified to ensure that it
operates as expected. The verification and prototyping can be
done through extensive network simulations. Furthermore, as
part of the visual inspection, it is important to constantly mon-
itor the quality of service of the communication in real-time to
avoid any possible hazard resulting from bad communication.
In the second step, it is recommended to take possible safe-
guards and (technical) protective measures that help to mitigate
remaining risks. In ISO 12100, the safeguards are defined
as ”protective measures to protect persons from the hazards
which cannot reasonably be eliminated or risks which cannot
be sufficiently reduced by inherently safe design measures”
[26]. For example, for the case of midair collision risk, we
can use parachute, airbags, or protection nets as possible safe-
guards and protective measures. Collision avoidance sensors
and propeller guards can be used to avoid collisions to walls.
In the case of 4G communication, it is possible to implement
failsafe mechanisms to prevent from risk of crashes, reduce
any further damage of UAV and ensure the safe drone opera-
tion, for example, the drone should land or return to home in
case of loss of wireless communication.
In the third step, information for uses are necessary to
reduce risk and ensures the safe drone operation. According
to ISO 12100, ”information for uses are protective measures
consisting of lists of elements of information (for example,
text, words, instructions, warning signs, markings and labels,
audible or visual signals) used to convey information to the
user, which may be essential for keeping risks on an acceptable
low risk level” [26]. In the case of 4G communication, it is
possible to implement information for use measures, which
are classified into three categories:
• Preflight: Before the flight, it is important to make
sure that the communication quality is up to a certain
acceptable level before starting the mission. In case of
bad communication is detected through sensor readings
signals , the drone will be prevented from taking-off and
starting its mission until the communication is resumed
at a good level.
• During the mission: The communication quality
should be monitored in real-time and in case of a high
degradation, the drone should operate autonomously in
a safe manner without depending on the control of the
ground station/user.
• Post-flight: After the mission is completed, the
log files can be analyzed to understand the reasons
behind the occurrence of risks during the mission (if any)
and develop additional protective measures to avoid bad
consequences when similar risks occur in the future.
In the case of loss of UAV electrical power, warning system
for alerting UAV pilot of battery failure are required and
real time battery information can be useful to take necessary
actions to avoid the consequence of this hazard.
In Table III and Table IV, we present all measures that might
be suitable for reducing the risks of the identified hazardous
events. We remind that the risk assessments, the severity levels
and probabilities are detected based on our understanding of
the illustrative use case of drone delivery.
After completion of risk assessment and risk reduction
following ISO 12100, the result of risk reduction is required to
implement protective measures (safeguards) employing safety
functions (are often called safety-related parts of control
systems (SRP/CS)) in order to eliminate hazard and/or reduce
risk. This will lead to part of ISO 13849 (Phase 2) to provide
safety specifications and guidance on the determination of a
required (adequate) level of Functional Safety in the form of
a required Performance Level (PLr).
2) Phase 2: The ISO 13849 Standard:
a) Safety Functions Identification:: The first step of
ISO 13849 is to identify the safety functions to be performed
by SRP/CS. The safety functions can be used as safeguarding
and protective measures. The best way is to take this infor-
mation directly from the results of risk reduction measures
performed in the ISO 12100 phase (Refer to Table III and
Table IV).
b) Performance Level Required Specification:: Once
the safety functions are identified, the required performance
level (PLr) must be calculated to specify the ability of safety-
related parts of the system to perform a safety function under
foreseeable conditions [52].
In other words, the PLr refers to the performance level that
must be applied to attain the required risk reduction for each
TABLE IV: Application of Functional Safety Methodology for Drone Delivery Application
ISO 12100 ISO 13849
Hazard Identification Risk Assessment Risk Reduction
Performance Level
Required Determination
ID Hazard Source Type Element Cause Consequence P S Risk Level
Risk Reduction
Measures
By Inherently
Safe Design
By
Safeguarding
By Information
For Use
S F P PLr
7
Autopilot controller
module failure
Internal Software UAV
Timing errors, memory corruption,
incorrect specification,
incorrect implementation,
inaccurate/ incorrect assumptions.
Loss of flight Remote Negligible Low
failsafe autopilot
intervenes when
failure of autopilot
detected
x S1 F1 P1 a
8
Failure/Inability to
avoid collision
External Obstacles UAV
Vision system failure,
erroneous waypoint that create
collision with obstacles,
harsh environmental condition,
inaccurate GPS signal,
inadequate design of collision
avoidance system,
another aircraft in close
proximity, fixed obstacles,
conflict with moving obstacles
Collision with obstacles,
UAVs, vehicle damage
Probable Critical High
Parachute, airbags,
propeller guards
x S2 F2 P1 d
Re-design of Collision
Avoidance System
x
Wind speed
monitoring
x
9 Pilot error External Human factor UAV
Pilot not familiar with the area,
pilot unfamiliar with equipment,
inexperienced pilots,
lack of training
Harm to people,
damage of drone;
damage of infrastructure
(high costs)
Remote Catastrophic Serious
failsafe
mechanism
x S2 F1 P2 d
10 Midair collision External Air traffic environment UAV Vision system failure
Damage or loss of one or
both of the aircraft,
damage to property
and people injury.
Remote Catastrophic Serious
Parachute, airbags,
or protection nets
x S2 F1 P2 d
Collision Avoidance
Sensors
x S2 F1 P2 d
11 Weather effects on UAV External Environmental conditions UAV
Severe weather or climatic events
(hurricanes, tornadoes,
thunderstorms,lightning,
wind shear, icing)
Vehicle loss of control Occasional Negligible Low
Wind speed
monitoring
x
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safety function. The required performance levels depend on
the expected risk that originates from each hazard and has to
be determined based on the risk estimation.
According to ISO 13849, the required performance level
PLr is estimated using a risk graph, as presented in Fig. 3.
The PLr is determined by estimating the three parameters
[52]: (i.) severity of possible injury (S), (ii.) frequency of
exposure to hazard (F) and (iii.) the possibility of avoiding
the hazard (P), for each safety function:
• Severity of possible injury (S): If the severity of injury is
high or induce death, S2 is selected, but S1 is selected if
the severity of injury is low.
• Frequency of exposure to hazard (F): Reflect the drone’s
degree of frequency and/or exposure to the hazard. F2
should be selected if the drone is frequently or contin-
uously exposed to the hazard, but F1 is selected if the
time of exposure to the hazard is short.
• Possibility of avoiding the hazard (P): when a hazardous
situation occurs, P1 should only be selected if there is a
realistic chance of avoiding an accident or of significantly
reducing its effect. P2 should be selected if there is almost
no chance of avoiding the hazard.
The final output of the risk graph in Fig.3 will indicate a
performance level required PLr, which is used to denote what
performance level is required by the safety function, which
is graded “a”to“e”. Clearly, the greater the risk of exposure
to a hazard, the higher the performance of the safety related
control needs to be.
Let us consider a case of wireless communication that is
not reliable to illustrate the process on how to estimate the
PLr. In the case of a degraded communication quality due
to networking issues, failsafe mechanism is a safety function
that must be designed to reduce the risk related to networking
issues. The degradation of communication quality can cause
damage to UAV which correspond to severity level S1. A
degraded communication quality could frequently be expected
to occur which make the drone frequently exposed to this
hazard (F2). When this hazard occurs, there is no possibility
to avoid it (P2). According to the risk graph in Fig.3, the PLr
required by the failsafe mechanism for eliminating hazardous
situation is “c”.
Fig. 3: Risk Graph for Determining the Required Performance
Level for a Safety Function from ISO 13849.
One of the most dangerous hazards to pilots is the mid-
air collision, which may occur remotely between two UAS
systems (frequency is F1). Depending on the nature of the
collision, they can result in the loss of one or both of
the aircraft. A secondary accident usually following mid-air
collisions is ground impact, that may injure people and damage
property. Potential damages resulting from all these accidents
include injury or fatality of people on the ground or on-board
another aircraft, damage or loss of the vehicle and damage
to property which correspond to severity level S2. When
this hazard occurs, there is no possibility to avoid it (P2).
According to the risk graph in Fig.3, the PLr required by the
safeguards (Parachute, airbags, or protection nets and collision
avoidance sensors) for eliminating hazardous situation is “d”.
Finally, the functional safety system must be documented.
Table III and Table IV contains all information carried out in
the safety risk assessment process to derive a functional safety
system.
Using these two standards, risk analysis is made in a
qualitative manner. However, these standards also demand a
quantitative analysis of risk. Bayesian networks can be used
to quantify and improve the qualitative risk assessment.
B. Quantitative Safety Analysis: Bayesian Networks approach
As mentioned earlier, the qualitative method based on the
functional safety assessment does not give a comprehensive
analysis and must be complemented with a quantitative anal-
ysis. In this section, we propose a quantitative risk analysis
method based on a Bayesian Networks approach to conduct a
more detailed analysis of the relationships among risk of drone
crashes and their causes to prevent the crash from occurring.
First, based on the safety analysis output described in ISO
12100 and ISO 13849, the Bayes model of the UAV crash risk
is created by causality; data were populated by collecting and
reviewing civil UAV accidents and the expected probability of
occurrence of a crash associated with UAV system deduced.
Second, a typical example of causal and diagnostic inference
was demonstrated. Third, a scenario analysis was established
for demonstration purposes. Finally, the result of the sensitivity
analysis is discussed.
1) The Bayesian Networks topology: The BN model is
typically composed of target, observable and intermediate
nodes [31]. Target nodes are nodes that represent variables
for which a probability distribution is computed (Probability
of drone crash).
Observable nodes represent variables that are measurable
or directly observable. These nodes provide the information
necessary to compute the prior probability of events connected.
Intermediate nodes are mainly defined to help manage the size
of the conditional probability tables (CPT), because too many
parent nodes with their states result in massive CPT structures
that are difficult to visualize. So, combining the parent nodes
into fewer intermediate nodes based on causal structures is a
practical solution. Following these instructions, we establish
21What are functional safety standards for servo drives?. Accessed: JAN-
UARY 18, 2017. [Online]. Available: https://www.motioncontroltips.com/faq-
whatarefunctionalsafetystandardsforservodrives/.].
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causal BN model between target, observable and intermediate
nodes to predict the risk of a crash of UAV during a mission
in different conditions.
Figure 4 describes the network topology that captures the
causal factors to produce a probability of a UAV crash due
to failure. Observing from top to bottom, the observable
nodes provide the information necessary to compute the prior
probability of connected events. Each node has a set of discrete
states (NO state; cause or fault is absent) and (YES state; cause
or fault is present). For example, the state pilot error will have
the value YES in case of pilot error and NO otherwise. Data
necessary to drive UAV risk model can be obtained based on
expert knowledge, experiments or by learning from historical
data. Thus, the next step involves the data collection.
2) Data collection: The Safety Management Document
provided by ICAO 22 indicates that past accident and incident
data collection is a key step and vital source of data, as they
give plenty of information that can be helpful to validate the
UAV risk analysis study.
Due to limitation (or probably absence) of concrete data of
drone crashes it is very challenging to derive exact probabili-
ties of events [24]. Thus, based on review of many references,
we set some illustrative probabilities (or frequencies) to show
how to apply the methodology, which is abstract and remain
valid from theoretical perspective. In case data is available in
the future, the analyst will be able to derive exact and more
realistic probabilities.
Consequently, in this paper, the data necessary to drive UAV
risk model was collected through a review of previous research
papers [35], [59]–[62], multiple online accident and incident
databases 23, and through a general website search 24. This was
done by posing this question: what are the common factors that
lead to UAVs accidents and incidents ?.
Clothier and Walker [35] used sample data from the U.S.
Department of Defense. This study of military UAVs accidents
and common failure categories identified common pilot error
as a cause of 17% accidents, autopilot control module failure
26% and loss of UAV electrical power 37%. The principal
sources of accidents according to [62] was collected from an
article published by the Washington Post, which reports that
the annual number of crashes has risen over the past decade,
to 26 crashes in 2012 and 21 in 2013, and the common cause
of a crash was loss of UAV electrical power for 38%, autopilot
control module failure 19% and pilot error factor 17%.
The analysis in [59] was based on summaries of UAV inci-
dents between 2010 and August 2014. This information was
obtained from the Naval Safety Center in Norfolk, Virginia.
Causal factors were related to pilot error factors (65%), 16%
related to system/component failure or malfunction factors,
and 19% related to special factors. In [60], UAV accident
data for the period 1995 - 2005 was taken from the U.S.
22(2013) Safety management manual (doc 9859). [Online]. Available:
www.icao.int/safety/SafetyManagement/Documents/Doc.9859.3rd%20Edition.
alltext.en.pdf.
23(1960-2015) Causes of fatal accidents by decade. [Online]. Available:
http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm.
24(2010-2016) UAV risk analysis. [Online]. Available: http://www.crash-
aerien.news/forum/drones-uav-etudes-des-risques-t35137.html.
Army accident database. These accidents are summarized
under system/component failure or malfunction (32%), pilot
error (11%), and weather effect factors (5%).
Belzer et al. [61] analyse data from the UAS database of
accidents and incidents between September 2001 and July
2016. The three most common errors were flight crew/pilot
error factors at 48%, system/component failure or malfunc-
tion 31% and mid-air collisions 19%. In [63], data were
collected from a 10-year period, 2006 to 2015, sourced from
the FAA Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing
System, NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System and the
Civil Aviation Authority. The collected data indicate that
system/component failure or malfunction (63%), pilot error
(15%) and navigation error (GPS loss) (11.53%) were the most
causal factor leading to UAV crashes. Table V summarizes
the percentage of common factors contributing towards the
occurrence of UAV crash.
The prior distribution of the root causes of crash risk
(observable nodes) were input to AgenaRisk 25 (Bayesian
Network and Simulation Software for Risk Analysis and
Decision Support) to infer the posterior distribution of each
node in BN. Based on the prior contribution of observable
nodes, the joint contribution of the intermediate nodes could
be obtained. The intermediate nodes have several parent nodes,
so their CPT structure is large. AgenaRisk software was used
to mitigate this difficulty, as it helps to calculate the conditional
probabilities. It is clarified that due to the lack of real probabil-
ity values, which necessitate the knowledge of exposure rates
per factor, we used the frequencies of each factor’s presence
in the UAV-related events, as explained above. Therefore,
wherever the term probability is used, this actually denotes the
frequency of contribution of each factor. Using the parameters
defined by AgenaRisk, coupled with weights among the nodes
defined, probability values in CPT can be calculated rapidly.
Figure 5 shows the Bayesian network topology and its initial
states. Both intermediate nodes output a set of four ordered
states: frequent, probable, occasional and remote. Using the
AgenaRisk software, a UAV crash due to the combination
of the internal and external factors considered will occur
with a frequency that is: negligible (60.106%), low (6.456%),
medium (7.128%), high (8.348%) and very high (17.961%) as
shown in Fig. 5.
3) Using the BN network to reason with risk: The inference
algorithms types are predictions, diagnostics, combined and
intercausal [64]. In our case, we were focused on how to use
BN for prediction calculations in order to demonstrate how
hazardous factors identified in previous sections can affect and
change the frequency of occurrence of a crash given a fault
from the list of the causal factors considered in the study.
a) Causal inference: Causal inference estimates the pos-
terior probability of a certain child node of the observed
evidence. It is also called forward inference since the inference
direction is from evidence to their child nodes. Causal infer-
ences are made by a simple query. A simple query computes
P (Xi/e), where the evidence e is the ancestor of Xi. A causal
25N. Birtles, N. Fenton, M. Neil, and E. Tranham, “Agenarisk manual
(version 6.1) computer software,” 2014.
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Fig. 4: A causal model for predicting UAV risk of crash.
TABLE V: Percentage of causal factors contributing to UAV crash.
REF
Pilot
error
(PE)
System/
Component
Failure or
malfunction
(SCFM)
Weather
effects
on UAV
(WE)
GPS
loss (GL)
Air traffic
management
Failure
(ATMF)
Inability to
avoid
collision
(IAC)
Security
attacks
on the
drone
(SAOD)
Mid-air
collisions
(MC)
Degraded
communication
quality
(DCQ)
Autopilot
controller
module
failure
(ACMF)
Loss of UAV
electrical
power
(LEP)
[59] 65 16 18
[60] 11 32 5
[61] 48 31.2 3.6 13.99 1.70 0.567 0.18 19.65 10.77
[62] 17 14 19 38
[35] 17 11 26 37
13 58 17 6 9
14 6.16 17.02 7.97 1.47 38.37 2.97
[63] 15 63 4.84 11.53 5.38 5.42 1.55
13 (1960-2015) Causes of fatal accidents by decade. [Online]. Available: http://www.planecrashinfo.com/cause.htm.
14 (2010-2016) Uav risk analysis. [Online]. Available: http://www. crash-aerien.news/forum/drones-uav-etudes-des-risques-t35137.html.
inference is suitable for finding the probability of a certain
fault, or the most likely fault after updating the evidence
[29]. As illustration, let us take the example of pilot error
as evidence in the causal inference in order to predict what
will happen. For example, after detecting the evidence of pilot
error that contributed to the crash, which means a frequency
of 100% for the YES state, we can update and estimate the
posterior distribution of frequencies of a crash based on that
new evidence using the BN model, causally related to the pilot
error. This inference reveals the extent to which the causal
evidence, i.e the pilot error evidence, affects the posterior
contribution to the target node, i.e “crash”. As a result, given
that a pilot error is detected, the frequency distribution of a
crash is changed: negligible (51.046%), low (7.44%), medium
(8.283%), high (10.161%) and very high (23.071%). The new
frequencies are easily calculated using the AgenaRisk software
by updating the state of the pilot error to be 0% for FALSE
state and 100% for the TRUE state.
b) Diagnostic inference: The diagnostic inference esti-
mates the posterior probability of a certain parent node from
the observed evidence. It is called backward inference, since
the inference direction is from evidence to its parents. Like
causal inferences, diagnostic inferences are made by a simple
query. A simple query calculates P (Xi/e), where the evidence
e is a child of Xi. Diagnostic inferences are appropriate for
determining the magnitude of a cause-effect on symptoms
[29]. Different from causal inference, diagnostic inference
estimates the posterior probability of a cause node, given an
effect node as evidence. Let us take the crash as an evidence
in the diagnostic inference. For example, we could think of a
simple diagnostic inference query: P (XCE = 1|XFC = 1).
That is, we can estimate the posterior frequency of external
sources under the evidence of crash. As the result of the query,
the distribution of frequencies of external factors is frequent
(42.76%), probable (6.247%), occasional (6.787%) and remote
(44.206%), after finding the evidence of “crash = very high”.
4) Scenario analysis: This section provides two examples
that demonstrate the use of the BN model presented in Fig. 4
to identify the parameters that have high impacts on the risk of
crashes and estimate the frequency distribution of UAV crash.
a) Scenario one: Hypotheses of external sources: In
this scenario, the UAV risk of crash under specific external
conditions is estimated. Four external factors are chosen to
represent the effect of the external source of hazards on the risk
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Fig. 5: Joint frequency distribution of risk of crash.
Fig. 6: Scenario one where external sources are considered.
estimation. This scenario is demonstrated in Fig. 6. The distri-
bution of UAV risk of crash is shown as negligible (29.276%),
low (10.076%), medium (11.844%), high (13.925%) and very
high (33.88%), which clearly indicates a remarkable increase
of risk level compared to the prior distribution. This means,
in case of the occurrence of an external error, the frequency
level of a crash increases from 17.961% to 33.88%, which
represents a very low safety flight condition. Of course, this
frequency is based on initial frequency distributions assump-
tions assigned to each observable state. In the case of real-time
safety monitoring, with the use of probability data and not
frequencies as used here due to unavailability of the former,
when the probability of the crash is very high, the responsible
agent will send a command to activate the risk mitigation
techniques summarized in Table III and Table IV.
b) Scenario two: Hypotheses of internal sources: In this
scenario, two internal sources of hazards are considered. The
results for this scenario are shown in Fig. 7. As per the result
of the BN model, the distribution of UAV risk of crash in
this scenario can be demonstrated as negligible (9.315%), low
(9.527%), medium (12.866%), high (19.996%) and very high
(48.296%), which is a significant increase in risk level. The
large value of the “very high” state in this scenario indicates
that certain risk control options must be used for these specific
conditions in order to mitigate or reduce the frequency of
crash. It also indicates that the risks of the crash would
become high with only a small change in the distribution of
frequencies.
5) Sensitivity Analysis: Sensitivity analysis plays an impor-
tant role in probabilistic risk assessment, illustrating the per-
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Fig. 7: Scenario two where internal sources are considered.
formance of each risk factor's contribution to the occurrence
of crash accidents of UAV. Considering the BN model of Fig.
4 again, it is interesting to know what are the nodes that have
the greatest contribution to the node “crash”.
AgenaRisk does this automatically by allowing us to se-
lect a target node and any number of other nodes (called
sensitivity nodes). So, setting Crash as the target node we
automatically obtain the tornado graph in Fig. 8. From a purely
visual perspective, we can think of the length of the bars
corresponding to each sensitivity node in the tornado graph
as being a measure of the contribution of that node to the
target one. Thus, the node external sources has by far the most
contribution to the node “crash”. The formal interpretation is
that the frequency of crash given the result of external sources
go from 0.102 (when external sources’ occurrence is remote)
to 0.531 (when external sources’ occurrence is frequent). The
frequency of crash given the result of internal sources go from
0.075 (when internal sources’ occurrence is remote) to 0.502
(when internal sources’ occurrence is frequent). The vertical
bar on the graph is the marginal frequency for crash being
very high (0.18).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a functional safety methodology for
drone crashes. Two approaches were used. The first approach
followed a qualitative safety risk analysis based on interna-
tional safety standards ISO 12100 and ISO 13849, in which
an analysis was conducted to identify hazards, along with their
possible causes existing safety mitigation methods and main-
taining functional safety recommendations, associated with
proposed UAV application and use case. The second approach
used a probabilistic model-based risk analysis method. By
using Bayesian Networks, a general crash accident model
was derived, incorporating causal relationships and conditional
probabilities. The use of Bayesian Networks as a modelling
tool well suited to, test and visualize hazard scenarios, estimate
the frequency of UAV crash and enable identification of the
factors that have the greatest contribution to the occurrence of
UAV crash. An example was given, and the simulation results
showed the feasibility of the proposed methodology.
Future work will extend the experimental evaluations to
include UAV simulations and real flight-testing as a means to
use probability figures instead of frequencies that were used
here for demonstration purposes. By the writer's opinions and
experiences, the processes of verification and validation of
safety functions are not easy to achieve and get more effective
result. Therefore, in order to get more effective result, we plan
to verify and validate the functional safety system to make sure
that the safety system meets the functional requirements, and
are suitable for the risk reduction. We are also investigating
how to implement artificial intelligence and cloud-based safety
assurance modules to allow monitoring and ensuring the safe
operation of drones during their mission.
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